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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOWELL D. PERRY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
EARL E. \'VOODALL, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
11014 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts recites those facts 
favorable to appellant instead of stating them favorably 
in support of the lower court's decision. This court re-
cently said: 
"This being a case in equity, it is our responsi-
bility to review the evidence. In doing so it is 
well to have in mind the general pattern as to the 
scope of such review as set out in prior adjudica-
tions in this court. Where there is a conflict in 
the evidence, the finding of the trial court will 
not be disturbed if the evidence preponderates 
in favor of the finding; nor, if the evidence 
thereon is evenly balanced or it is doubtful where 
the preponderance lies; nor, even if its weight 
is slightly against the finding of the trial court, 
but it will be overturned and another finding made 
only if the evidence clearly preponderates against 
his finding." Nokes vsContinenta.Z Mining & Mill-
i11g Co. et al, (i Utah 2d 177, 308 P. 2d 954. 
Vle thir,k tlw facts can he~ fairlv smm11ari;~cd hv followin•r . . " 
the format of th(~ lower court's findings of fact, anrl 
showing how tlH·y arv :.;u1>portl·d b~· the evidvllt\'. 
Perry was president of Bny \Vise Drugs Inc. err. 
:30). He experi enccd great di fficnlty in the rnanage11wnt 
of the business (Tr. 75). The assets for a considerable 
period of tirnc had been insufficient to cover the liahilities 
of the corporation err. 7-~). Becanse of this, Perry was 
discouraged 8.nd wanted to salvage what he could (Tr. 
37). 
liVoodall was a 13liarrnacist who had been working 
at the store (Tr. 3G) m:d Perry became convinced in 
his own mind that he could solve his own problems if 
he could sPll tlw eorporate stock iu the company to 
·woodall (Tr. 6, 37). 
\Voodall \nts t11<·n, 1n g('lleral, awan' that the store 
was having some financial difficulties but he had held 
himself aloof from the financial t>nd of the business and 
did not aii1n·eeiatP the <'.:dent of the financial prohle111~ 
(Tr. 55, 124). 
Perr~', prior to 1\Iarch 14, 19G4, represented to Wood-
all that by an investrrn•nt of $6,500 all seriously pressing 
financjal problems of the' store would be resolved (Tr. 
38, 39). Peny did not inform \Voodall that he had 
either delivered, or eam;ed to he in the process of de 
livery, certain ehecks in an amount greatly in excess 
of $6,500 to pay some of th(• aeeonnh; iiayable (Tr. 38). 
Woodall k1ww that tl1tJ'(' \\'('t"<' approximately $5,000 of 
outstanding checks ('I1r. 41) but in fact there were checks 
in excess of $20,000 then written (Tr. 38, 64, 70). Perry 
was being hounded by creditors ('I1r. 70). Because there 
were no funds to cover these checks when they were later 
[ll'Psented, fourteen of them bounced (Tr. 70, 71, 108, 
Ex. 7). The books of the corporation showed the accounts 
on which checks had been drawn as having been paid even 
though the checks had not been delivered nor cashed 
(Tr. 105). 
Perry represented that the business was being oper-
att•d at a profit (Tr. 38, 60, 84, Ex. 6) with a resultant 
surplus in excess of $12,000 (Ex. L). In fact, the business 
had lost money during the first part of 1964 and each 
of the two previous years (Tr. 84). Instead of a surplus 
there was a deficit (Tr. 83, 84, 90, 120, 134). 
The total indebtedness was represented to be less 
than $47,000 (Ex. L) whereas, in fact, it was in excess 
(If $61,000 (Tr. 39, Ex. D). 
Woodall, because of his close association with Perry, 
accepted said representations without any serious en-
lleavor to find out exactly what the financial condition 
was, except for a general revimv of an inventory that 
had been taken and examining the balance sheets in 
1,vidence (Tr. 45, 46). Woodall did not appreciate the 
full extent of the indebtedness of the corporation until 
.Inly of 19G4 (Tr. 38). Woodall in July of 1964 indicated 
to Perry a desire to rescind the agreement and attempt 
to rPnegotiate (Tr. 39) to purchase assets instead of 
1·orpora te stock (Ex. C). This indication was prior to 
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the corporation\, being forced into reeeivership. llt-
ceivership proceedings were begun in Angust of 19G4 
(Tr. 21) on the petition of one of the major crf'diton 
(Tr. 74). In order to acquire all the assets of the corpora-
tion, which he expectt•d to acquin~ indirectly through 
purchase of all of the stock of the corporation from 
Perry for $50,000, ·w oodall bid $-±5)000 and purchased 
them from the n~ceiver ('l1r. 40). He is vresently paying 
that arnuullt to tlw n'tl'iVt'l' (Tr. -to) for tlH· assds a;:: tht.1 
\\ \'l'(' at tht• tilll<' of' t]w ]'('C('iV('l':-;]lip C:U](•. rJ'h<•]'(• \I l'J'i' 
tl1e11 11ton• assP(s tl1m1 nt tli" l 1\lJ(' of' tll<· ll1i:-;n·pn•s('J1L1-
tio11 (Tr. 76). 
Woodall does not liave tl1<' certificates of stock in 
Buy \Vise Drug. rn1ey were in hi:o pm;session for inspec-
tion at one tiin<· but were rd urned by 11im (Tr. 20, 28, 38). 
Punrnant to the exec11tion of tht> agrt>ement to buy thl' 
stock, the following was eitlwr r<•ceind h>- Perry or hy 
others for Perry's benefit: 
(a) rrhe ~mm of $1,810 (Tr. 9, G5). 
(h) l\frrchandise of a valtw of $1,700 (rrr. 2(i). Al-
though P<•rn- claims tliat tlw valn<• of the merchandis<' 
·was offad hy th<' value of th<:>ater tickets given by him 
to \Voodoll; no snch tiehts IYPl'P given (Tr. 59). 
(c) $800 rec('in•d h>- th(• L.D.S. Church for PPrr<~ 
pernonal tit}w ('l'r. G<l). 
( d) $:255.:2() l'P('<'i\-c'd Ji:- l\latiri<·<· Andnso11 for 
Perr:-·\; rwrsonal elothillg ('T'r. 14, .B~x. ::n. 
(t') $1 IS.OO !'or P<·1T:-·'~ JH'l'sonal automobile insnr-
anct~ ('L'r. 11, Ex. 3). 
(f) $15:2.50 receind by Perry's attorney for per-
~onal legal services ( 1'r. 11). 
AHGUMEN'l' 
POINT I. 
VARIOUS INFERENCES ARE UNFOUNDED. 
Certain statements of facts and inferences in Perry's 
brief are worth)' of comment. The references are to 
the vage on which they are found in Perry's brief: 
p. 2. 1 t is stated that failure of vVoodall to invest 
+ii,;)00 in the business or make payments required by the 
!'ontract resulted in the receivership. $6,500 is an insig-
11ifi('ant part of the $61,000 total indebtedness. In fact 
~;4,000 to $5,000 was invested in the business to pay on 
both old and new accounts (Tr. 43, 45). 
lJ. 2. It is stated that Woodall agreed to buy the 
n:-;st•ts of the corporation at the receivership sale by pay-
ing "$45,000 at which time the total liabilities and net 
worth were $86,000, leaving net assets of $41,000 over 
liabilities." The implication seems to be that a $41,000 
profit \\'as made by this purchase in receivership. This 
i~ fallacious. Liabilities plus net worth minus purchase 
price do not equal net assets over liabilities. More im-
portantly, whether or not Woodall made an advantageous 
hu:, at a receinrship sale conducted by a court and open 
lo public bidding is wholly irrelevent. Looking at it from 
Woodall's point of view, he was buying a dead horse, and 
i1 his obligation to pay the $50,000 to Perry for the stock 
il! tl1<> <"Orporation werP not rescinded, he would be paying 
twie<>. Fmth<·rntorP, the assets would have snbstantiall:-' 
(j 
c-hanged betw<•en the tinw lL• agTePd to bn~· tlw sto('k 
and the tinw tlw n'cuivers11ip sal(" was ev<>ntually held. 
p. 2, 6, 29 .. It is stated that tlie evidence Klmws latPr 
profitable opt·ration. It is compldely irrelevant wl1at 
profit or loss resulted to a ne1Y corporation using as part 
of its assets, assets purchased. in the n·ceivership. 1'hat 
\Yould be due to varions factors such as amount of capital, 
skill of management, long hours spent by Woodall as 
manager, redi:ction in nurnlwr of employePs (Tr. 122, 
138). 
p. 12. It is stat<•d that \Voodall's tl1en attorne~· made 
110 objedion to tlw fact that indehh~dness Pxceeded $6,500. 
At the time the letter ·was written, Peny as well as 
-Woodall was l'("negotiating to make a new deal. The 
ldkr itself states that the offer is made on the assump-
tion that the lll'eYi01rn agreement is Yoid. There was no 
reason to reYiew a11 past differences in a letter wherein 
an offer is lwing made to arrive at a IW\\' bargain. 'l1h(' 
tone of tlw letter assumes that both partiPs recognizP that 
the old trnnsaetion for the pnrchase of corporate stock 
was no longer binding and th(~>- are now att~mpting to 
make a 1W\Y agreement wh(>n•li~- assets would he pnr-
(' lias(•cl. 
(' 
()] 
p. 1::3. It is statPd that \Voodall's a('countant kne\\ 
tlH• financial diffienltiPs and it is impliPd that that 
knowledge is irnpntahle to \Voodall. The accountant WM 
not ('1ll1Jlon·d lJy \Voodall nnti I A ug11st of 19G4, so hi' 
I , • ' 
knmdPdg(' would bP of no sigHif'ieunc<> ('f'r. S2). 
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p. t:-l, 25. lt is stated that Woodall changed his 
1<·stimon~- as to the representation about $6,500. His 
il·:-;tirnon)· bdon' thP introdudion of l~xhibit L related 
to pressing current accounts. He testified that Perry 
~aid, "Yon invest $6,500 into this business, and he said, 
.mu will pretty well clear np the current accounts payable. 
HP sa~d it is fun to overate a business this ·way when you 
<'an just operate and go from month to month" (Tr. 38). 
There was no vacillation. 
p. 17. It is stated that the outstanding checks were 
all paid before .T uly 3rd and that they were paid from 
~lore receipts without any investment or payment by 
Woodall. Woodall stated he had put four to five thous-
and dollars in the business (Tr. 43). It is implied that 
tlw operation was tremendously profitable. It ignores the 
fact that this was just a clearing off of the oldest indebt-
<'\bwss and that current operations would have been 
ert>ating nFw indt>btedness. It also ignores the fact that 
otliPr old indebtedness resulted in receivership. 
p. 20. It is stated that there was a representation 
lhat a profit had been made during the first part of 
l9G4 (Tr. 38). It is then stated that Woodall, in his 
operation for the entire year, made a profit, implying 
that that made the representation true. This is a non-
Keqnitnr. In fact there had been a loss during the first 
part of tlll' .\·ear as well as a loss during each of the two 
1n·\;\·iom; years (Tr. 84). 
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POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE.: SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS AND 
THE FINDINGS SUPPORT THE JUDGl\lENT. 
':I.1he findings are reflvd<'cl <:ilrnost V\'rlmtirn in tlu~ 
aboye ::-;tatPrnent of .lads aud Padi 01w i::-; s11p1>ori.Pd hy thl· 
evidence fo1rnd at Hiv r·ag('S of tht· n•(·onl as cih•d. 
p. ~(). Perr>· argm~s that som<• of tlH· findings dett•J'-
mine that ;;ome misre1ll'esentations Wt>n~ made which 1yer1• 
not exvressl>· ddineatPd in th<:> plE~auings. No objeetion 
was raised at tlH~ trial to the e\·id(mce relating to tlw ims-
re1Jresentations. l\o motion to strikP \~vid<·1we 1ya;-; matk 
Although a motion for a 1ww trial was made, orn' of tlll· 
possihl(' ha:,;es for :,;uch motion 11nder Rnle 59(a) UlJ. 
~'urpri::><', was not a basis of welt motion (Tr. 30). An 
opportunit>· was given to PPny to show what additional 
1ww evidence ·would lw pr<'S('nted if a new trial wer(' 
granted and nothing was pn•sPnted (Tr. ;3~)). RulP 15(11) 
prnvides: 
''(h) A:\lJi~NDMEXTS TO CONFOHl\l 'l'O 
'I' HI~ F,YIDENCK--Wht•n issnPs not rai:,wtl hy 
th<· plPadings are t ri<'<l h~- ''XlJn':;:-; or implied e011-
sPnt of th<• iiarti<'s, tlw>· shall he treakd in a11 
l'l'~;peds as if thP;; had been raif;Pd in the plead-
ing~'. Snch arn1•r:dmt•nt of thP pl('adings a;.; ma: 
h<' n<'ePssarv to canst> thc;m 10 conform to th" evi-
d(•ncP and t~ raise the:w issues maY hP madP npon 
motion of an~,r party at an>, forn•, <·.,·<'n aft<'!" j11 dµ-
lll('Jli: lrnt failure so to amend doe:; not nf'frd tlw 
result of the trial of tlH·S<' issnPs .... " 
11;\'('ll l'l<dn l'o11111•r 1:\\1 ;u1 olij(•dioll that tlin<· is n \ ari-
am·i· ]H·l\\'Cl'll pl<·ading and prnol' earn10t h<' tak<'ll for tl](' 
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first time on appeal. JlcCall Company us. Jennings, 26 
\'tali 459, 4<i4, 73 P. G:39. In Draper vs. J.B.&R.E. Walker, 
f 11r·., l:!l Ctah 5G7, 2H P. 2d 3GO this court said." 
''\Ve belie\·e that by pennitting evidence to be 
n·ceived concerning the rights-of-way that it can-
not be heard to complain that the issues do not 
permit a finding that t]w plaintiffs had rights-of-
·way and that they were blockaded by the defend-
ant. We think Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil J>rncedun,• ::il·t forth above automatically 
takes care of that contention." 
p. 27. Perr.\· asserts that a representation that, by 
an invPstuwnt of $6,500, all seriously pressing financial 
prohlerns would he resolved, is not a representation of 
fad, but is only opinion. We contend that this is a repre-
.~(·ntation of fact as to the status of accounts payable. 
l n Harp(~l' and .J anw:::;, The Law of Torts, Vol. 1, p. 
;)()(), this ddinition of "fact" is given: 
"The courts will ordinarily classify a state-
ment as fact if it relates to an event or state of 
affairs which either exists at the present moment 
or has had a past existence and if that event or 
state of affairs is susceptible of knowledge." 
PPrry contends that it was not shown that this par-
1 i('ular representation was false because a receivership 
might not have resulted had -Woodall paid the purchase 
price instead of rescinding. He argues that, because more 
111onP,\' might have placated creditors, the fact that they 
11·pn• not offerPd rnorn~y precludes a determination as 
ro whetlwr or not the,\' constituted a financial problem . 
. \etual a<·cornplis]m1e11t is not the only 11wthod of estab-
licd1i11g a proposition. 
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Th<' court concluded, in its memorandum decision, 
that tlw repr<'sentation 1rns false, stating that Perry, 
unknown to \Voodall "had either delivered or caused to 
be in tlw process of delivery a number of checks in 
excess of the sum of $9,000.00 to pay accounts payabh'. 
The defendant did not know the magnitude of tlwsP 
checks and would not have bought the store had he known 
the extent of the immediately pending debt" (rrr. 32). 
The comt's findings are to the same effect: "Plaintiff 
did not inform defendant that he had either delivered 
or caused to be in the process of delivery certain checks 
in an amount greatly in excess of $6,500 to pay some of 
the accounts payable, for which there were no funds to 
cover" (Tr. 25). But, more importantly, the representa-
tion did not relate to what creditors would do in the 
fnture, but rather, the extent of the then existing obliga-
tions owed those creditors then seeking payment. 
p. 27. Perry argues that payments by Woodall 
v·rnuld have helped to solve Perry's financial problems 
and citE~s Perr~/s opinion to that effect CI1r. 71). The 
court need not believe Perry\; testimony. Whether or 
not payn1ents would have hel1wd solve problems is not 
relevant to the question as to thP truth of a representation 
n•garding whether or not prohl<•rns Pxisted and the extent 
thereof. 
JJ. 28. Pe1Ty argue:-; that inasmuch as the profit and 
loss stat<:~rnent included salaries, the statPment showing 
a loss is not proof that the corporation was not making 
a profit. l t wonld lw a JH'euliar financial statement which 
di<l not irn·lud<· salari<•s. Fnrth('rmore, the highest salary 
11 
11 a;-; L\'l'S tltan $12,0UO, 1\·hid1 ltardl.'· reflects an excessive 
l'X [ H'llSe. 
Jl· 28. P(·rry argnes that the representation that 
tlH·re 1rns a surplus in excess of $12,000, whereas in fact, 
tli(·J'P was a deficit, ·was an afterthought. The deficit was 
inc:dent to a lack of profit, which was expressly made 
an i ;-;sue by the pretrial order (Tr. 19). 
p. :28. Perry argues that lwcause the misrepresenta-
tion regarding snrplus was not a part of the memorandum 
(kcision, that it was not an inducement. A memorandum 
llP<'ision is not intended to cover all points. If it were, 
tlture wonld be no need to have findings. Furthermore, 
11]1\'thl'l' or not tlw judge had something in mind is no 
1·rit<·rion as to\\ hethPr or not \\'oodall was relying on the 
n·presentation. 
p. 28. Perry argues that a surplns depends on how 
the acconntant handles Yalnes. l!'or the purpose of argu-
lllFnt, conceding that to be so, the conrt determined from 
the evidence that, on a proper accounting basis, there 
1rns a deficit ( 11 r. 25). Perry's own balance sheets showed 
deficits (Tr. 84, 85, Ex. 1). Perry argues that good will 
shonld bP considered, and implies that if a figure were 
assnmed for an asset of good will, that then there would 
lia \'(' been a smplus. It is doubtful that a corporation 
about to go in n•eeivership has a good will of any value. 
ThPn-' is no evidP1we thereon whatsoever. Furthermore, 
,j 1H'P none of PPrry's financial statt'ments included good 
11 ill, it is appan·nt it ·was not eonsidered to be an asset. 
p. 29. Perry argtws that subsequent profits prove<l 
the ·worth of the business. As pointed out above, there 
are many umm-'asured variables, other than the value of 
assets acquired by imrchase at the n·ceiv(_•rship sale, 
which ·would affect subse<1nent nd profits of the new 
corporation formed by \¥ oodall. 
POINT III. 
THE NINE ESSENTIAL ELEl\lENTS OF FRAUD 
ARE PRESENT. 
The above stakuwnt of facts shows that the court 
expressly found on each of the nine elements of franrl 
required by this court in Pace vs Parish, 122 Utah 141, 
247 P. 2d 273, and the citations to the record show how 
each finding is supported. Under the accepted rules of 
revie\v as set forth in Nokes vs Contine1ital Mining & 
lllilli11g, supra, this conrt should not subsitute its findings 
for that of the lower court. 
POINT IV. 
WOODALL HAS NOT WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO 
RESCIND. 
As set forth in the stakment of facts abov<', the 
findings, amply supported h)- the evidence, are to the 
(-'ffect that ·w oodall becauw a ware in J nly of the full 
(·xtent of thP misrepresentations, that in J nly he indicated 
to Perry a desirP to rescind the agreement, and that hr 
atternpkd to rPnPgotiat<· (Tr. 39) to purchase assets in-
~.;kad of eorporate stock (liJx C). Perry himsl'lf recog-
nized that thP prior agreement was no longer in effect 
wtwn hl' statP1l in Odohn that he was taking over tlw 
111trnagPJtl<•11t ol' th<· st on• ('l'r. 91). Fnrthen1t0n', in hi~ 
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(kaling" with the receiv1:~r, he contemplated that he would 
n•c\·i\·P the excess of any hid over the amount of indebted-
1wss, ,,·liich indicated that Perry himself did not deem 
~lw rnntrnd of sale in force ('rr. 25). The corporation 
lH'iug snbjed to rPceiYPrship proceedings in August, it is 
1 n<·onC't'i ,·able that ·w oodall would have still wanted to 
11a.' $:-i0,000 for ib corporate stock, and that he did not 
a<l11nc to his rmrpos'~ to rescind the stock purchase con-
1 rnd, nor is then· an:· evidence that lie did not so adhere. 
p. :29. Pen:· arg1ws that by possession of the assets 
Woodall has waived his right to rescind. He is in posses-
~ion of assets, not because he bought the corporate 
,,toek from Perry, but because the receiver would have 
Imel those assets if vVoodall had not agreed to pay $45,000 
!or them (Tr. 40). 
POINT V. 
PERRY IS IN HIS FORMER STATUS QUO. 
Pt>rry argut>s that, because V\T oodall did not \vithdraw 
I rnm the btclding at the receivership sale of the corporate 
as:·wts, so that a Mr. Butterfield's bid would be the only 
hid, that Perr:· has not been able to recoup all of his 
anticipated gain from a salt~ to Butterfield, through 
11 l1i<·h P<'JTY would have been made whole and put in his 
I ornH'l' status quo. Such rt>asoning assumes in the first 
ph1c<· that the receivership conrt rejected a bid $30,000 
lid tPr than 'y oodall's. It is a novel argument that a 
:'<·ll<'r would hav<' obtaint>d a better price with fewer 
hid<l<·rs. Fnrtlwrn10n\ it is strdehing the concept of 
IH·i11g pht<'.ed in status qllo to a ridiculons extent to argue 
that Woodall\; bidding or n'frnining from biclding at a 
later n~cPiYETship sa!P of inv<'ntory and other as:-;ets ha~ 
anything to do with l'l'storing· Perry to liis former ])QSi-
tion as to corporate stock ownership. 
p. 34. Perry implie:-; that hecam;e, a:s of the end ol 
1965, \V oodall acq nired assets of a hook value of roughly 
$86,000, for $45,000 by being t11e higher bidder at the 
receivership sale, that in order to bt• pnt in statm; quo, 
Perry should be paid part of the clif i'Prence. Such an 
argument ignores the reality that Perry was the owntr 
of the corporate stock of tlw corporation, which was in 
receivership. At th<' sa!P of the receivership m-;sds to 
the highest bidder at public auction, the creditors of the 
<'orporation would first lw paid and if there was a sur-
plus that would he paid to the owner of the stock. If 
there was something amiss in the receivership sale, 
Perry's renwd~- was to show ·what was wrong, or to get 
someone• to hid t.·nough at the sale so that lte could realize 
some valtH~ from his stock. Failing in that, the result is 
that Pc•rry's stock, in fact, had no actnal value. Whether 
'Voodall made an advantageow; or disadYantageons pur-
chase at a later receivership sale of assets, is entirely 
irrelevant to the qnPstion as to -..vhetlwr or not Perry 
is in statns quo. He ha:-; his stock. which was then and 
:-;till is worthless. 
POINT VI. 
THE RESTITUTION WAS PROPER. 
PPrr~· l1irnself eom'<'d('<l lo th<' C'ourt that the hulk 
of th(' ai1101111t of $-±,'-i;)f). /(i, onl!'rt>d paid 'Voodall h.v 
15 
l''.·r1·:·, constitutetl a propn claim. In testifying as to 
d1at nedits should be allowed to ·woodall, Perry con-
rcd<·d that he had received as vayment on the contract 
+1 /)10, attorneys' fees for personal matters of $152.50, 
1'<11' insnranee premium for his personal car $118.00 (Tr. 
~l. l 0, 11). 
The lialance of tlw items are the following: (a) Mer-
dian disc~ of a value of $1,700. Perry argues that he 
tlto t1glit thC'se were paid for by an exchange of theatre 
(!ekets. vVoodall testified he never did receive the tickets 
( 'l'r. 59), and the court believed Woodall, as shown by 
finding 13. (b) $800 personal tithe to the L.D.S. Church, 
( c) $255.26 payments to a clothing store for personal 
elothing (Tr. 14 and 66, Ex. 3). Perry personally re-
et'in~d the lwnefit of these payments. 
POINT VII. 
THREE l\IISREPRESENTATIONS ARE NOT SUB-
STANTIALLY DISPUTED. 
Perr.\''s brief sets forth various arguments as to 
"" 11: n'seis:-;ion should not be ha:,wcl upon the misrepre-
,1·11tntion as to pn'ssing aC'.COlmts payable. There is al-
l\\ost no argm11ent advanced as to why rescission based 
npon th<· other threP misrepresentations, as to profit, 
'lll'}Jlns aJl(l total <lPht do not support a reseission. 
CONCLUSION 
Perry in his brief has ignored the fact that the 
lo\\'<'r conrt believed \Voodall, and disbelieved Perry. 
lIP is a~;king t11is court to ignore the findings and con-
1·h1sio11s of tlw lower court, which are amply supported 
lG 
by the evidence, and renn;e on the basii:; of his own 
testimony, which the lower comt 1rns entitled to disbelieve 
in its entirety because of Perry's bias. Arnold Machinery 
Co., vs Intritsion Prepaid Inc., 11 Utah 2d 246, 357 P. 
2d 496. The findings are to the effect that there were 
four separate misrepresentations, each of which aloue 
was material and supports a rescision relating to: 
1. Pressing accounts payable. 
2. Profit. 
,3. Surplus. 
4. r1_1otal indebtedne8S. 
rrhe judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRAYTON, LOWE & HURLEY 
.JOHN W. LOWE 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent. 
